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Abstract
What makes you a successful cooperator? Using data from the British television
game show “Golden Balls” we analyze a prisoner’s dilemma game and its pre-play.
We find that players strategically select their partner for the PD, e.g., they bear in
mind whether contestants lied. Players’ expectations about the stake size strongly
influence the outcome of the PD: The lower the stakes, the more likely players
successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is encouraged by
mutually promising not to defect and shaking hands on it, but a mere handshake
serves as manipulating device and increases successful defection.
∗This is a revised version of an earlier paper (July 2010) that circulated under the title “Golden
Balls: A Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment”. The authors thank Armin Schmutzler, Nick Netzer, Michelle
Goeree, Daniel Schunk, Kevin Staub, the seminar participants in Zurich, and the participants of the ESA
Meeting 2010 in Copenhagen for helpful discussions and suggestions as well as Max Pfister for excellent
research assistance. Financial support of the Swiss National Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The
data were provided to the authors by the television show producers, courtesy of Endemol UK plc, in
May 2009.
†Both authors: Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Blu¨mlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich.
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1 Introduction
The well known prisoner’s dilemma game has become the classic economic example to
demonstrate non-cooperative behavior: Two contestants face a “dilemma” in which, inde-
pendent of the other’s action, each player is better off by defection than by cooperation.
But, the outcome obtained when both defect is worse for each player than the outcome
they would have obtained if both had cooperated. Thus, self-interested behavior does not
unequivocally lead to a globally optimal solution. Two players who both pursue rational
self-interest may end up worse off than if both act contrary to rational self-interest.
This paper uses data from the television show “Golden Balls” which gives us the oppor-
tunity to analyze cooperative behavior in an environment of high stakes and face-to-face
communication between players as well as players’ behavior in the pre-play. Players are
not only allowed to talk to each other, but they have the possibility to play with each
other, and thereby build a reputation of being trustworthy or being a liar.
The show consists of three rounds, the first two are pre-play and in the third two contes-
tants play a prisoner’s dilemma with defection being a weakly dominant strategy. Starting
with four contestants, each round every player is randomly assigned a certain cash value.
These values are partly common knowledge and partly private information for the respec-
tive player. Then players make truthful or untruthful statements about their values. At
the end of each round, each player has to cast a vote against one of the other players.
The one who receives the majority of votes has to leave the show empty-handed and
her values are taken out of the game. Thus, the selection procedure determines the two
finalists and the stake size at the same time and does not involve any effort provision by
the contestants. The two final players decide about the division of the stakes via playing
a prisoner’s dilemma. Immediately before the dilemma is played, they can discuss their
intentions with respect to their final decision.
Our contribution consists not only of (i) the analysis of cooperative behavior in the
presence of high stakes and face-to-face communication, but also of (ii) the analysis of
the players’ behavior in the pre-play, especially their voting decisions with respect to its
influence on the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. Concerning cooperative behavior, we
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observe a unilateral cooperation rate of 55% and a mutual cooperation rate of 33%. Our
analysis shows a negative correlation between the stake size and the cooperation rate with
a substantial decline around the level of £500. In games with stakes below that value,
the unilateral cooperation rate even increases to 74%, and the mutual cooperation rate to
56%. Further, we can show that player’s expectation about the stake size matters. If the
jackpot is lower than expected, the players are more likely to cooperate. With respect to
communication, certain words and gestures are more important than others. Mutually
promising each other to cooperate and shaking hands on it increases the cooperation rate,
whereas shaking hands without a promise leads to a decline. Apart from those effects,
demographic characteristics, such as age and place of residence, matter.
The analysis of the contestants’ behavior in the pre-play shows that players make their
voting decision dependent on objective criteria such as their opponent’s monetary contri-
bution to the stake size, but also on subjective criteria such as the player’s trustworthiness
and race. In addition, we observe that the weight given to objective and subjective cri-
teria changes between the first and the second voting decision. In the second round,
apart from stake size, player’s trustworthiness seems to be more important than player’s
demographics. Further, we show that there is a strong link between the two rounds of
pre-prisoner’s dilemma play and the player’s decision on cooperation. For instance, we
find that whether a player lied about her stakes in the pre-play has a significant effect on
the cooperation rate.
While writing the first draft of this paper, published in July 2010, it came to our at-
tention that van den Assem, van Dolder and Thaler (2010) are independently analyzing
data from “Golden Balls”. They came out first with a working paper in April 2010. The
only overlap of both studies is the analysis of unilateral cooperation, focussing on the
final round. As we mentioned, we also extensively analyze the pre-play and link it to
the mutual and unilateral decision outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game. We addi-
tionally include variables describing communication, e.g., whether players shake hands or
promise each other to cooperate, or lied before. Because of the independent construction
of the data set, both studies differ with regard to the definition and modeling of variables.
Therefore our analysis and results differ in various aspects.
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The structure of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a brief review of
the related literature, Section 2, followed by a description of the game show and data set,
Section 3. In Section 4 we explain the strategic considerations of the players and moti-
vate our analysis. Sections 5 and 6 represent the main part of the paper, including the
empirical analysis and obtained results on cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma
as well as contestants’ voting behavior in the pre-play. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
In this section, we first review studies that are closely related to our paper in terms
of using television show data and/or in terms of considering a prisoner’s dilemma with
defection being the weakly dominant strategy. Secondly, we present studies analyzing
the effect of stake-size, anonymity, communication, and gestures on cooperative behavior
in social dilemma games. Finally, we give a brief overview of results about lying and
discrimination in voting decisions.
Television game shows and weak prisoner’s dilemma
Related studies that use television game show data are List (2006), Oberholzer-Gee,
Waldfogel and White (2010), and Belot, Bhaskar and van de Ven (2010). The first two
analyze “Friend or Foe”, a US game show, and the latter analyzes “Will (s)he share or
not?”, a show from the Netherlands. In both shows pairs of players build a jackpot by
answering trivia questions together. The teams have to decide about the division of their
accumulated jackpot by playing a prisoner’s dilemma with weakly dominant strategies.
In contrast, in “Golden Balls” stakes are built by a random process and the two final
players are selected on the basis of a two-round voting procedure. In addition, “Golden
Balls” provides the opportunity to analyze a game with very high stakes, i.e., the average
jackpot is more than three times as high as the average jackpot in “Friend or Foe” and its
median value is more than three times the median in “Will (s)he share or not”. All three
studies find a very high cooperation rate (around 50%), but only Belot et al. (2010) find
an effect of the stake size.
Little empirical work has been done on cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games in which
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defection is a weakly dominant strategy.1 Ortmann and Tichy (1999) analyze the game
with respect to gender differences. They find an overall cooperation rate of 46%, and that
females cooperate more frequently than males. Studies related to the idea of Rapoport
(1988) show that the cooperation rate is higher in a prisoner’s dilemma with weakly
dominant strategies than in one with strictly dominant strategies.2
Stake size, anonymity, and communication
The effect of the stake size on cooperation rates in dilemma games is widely debated and
no clear answer has been found so far. Some experiments show that there is no significant
effect, whereas others suggest that the cooperation or contribution rate decreases with
the stake size (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
Compared to experiments in the laboratory, contestants in “Golden Balls” do not anony-
mously play the prisoner’s dilemma and are allowed to communicate with each other
before choosing their action. The relevance of anonymity in dictator games is shown by
Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994). If people feel observed by the experi-
menters they are more altruistic than in a double-blind setting. In addition, Rege and
Telle (2004) showed that the framing of the instructions of the game may raise the co-
operation or contribution rate. Since the players in the game under consideration are
filmed and play in front of a large television audience, we can expect a similar effect, i.e.,
a positive effect on cooperation. The cooperation rate we observe is, however, not much
different to the rate reported by Ortmann and Tichy (1999), which might suggest that
the effect of the audience is not as strong as expected.
In addition, experimental studies have shown that communication increases the coop-
eration rate significantly (for surveys see Sally, 1995; Ledyard, 1995), although from a
theoretical point of view in a prisoner’s dilemma communication is cheap talk (see e.g.,
1There is a vast experimental literature on prisoner’s dilemma games in which defection is a strictly
dominant strategy. There the observed cooperation rate varies between 30-40% (see e.g., Shafir and
Tversky, 1992).
2Rapoport (1988) finds that the cooperation rate in a prisoner’s dilemma without fear (=̂ payoff
difference between the mutual defector’s and unilateral cooperator’s payoff) is higher than in one with
fear and predicts a cooperation rate of 50% for a no-fear dilemma that corresponds to the game analyzed
in this paper. The prediction is independent of the stake size. Rapoport’s findings are supported in
experiments conducted by Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, Shupp and Walker (2001) as well as Ahn, Ostrom,
Schmidt and Walker (2003).
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Crawford, 1998; Farrell and Rabin, 1996).3 Bohnet and Frey (1999) analyze the effects
of face-to-face communication on cooperative behavior and show that it is very effective,
i.e., they observe an increase in the unilateral cooperation rate up to 78%.
Apart from the effects of face-to-face communication, gestures such as a smile might have
an impact on cooperation. Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik and Wilson (2001) investigate
the impact of a smiling face on people’s behavior in a one-shot trust game. They find that
subjects are significantly more likely to trust smiling counterparts. Manzini, Sadrieh and
Vriend (2009) address this issue in the minimum effort game and test whether people’s
propensity to choose high effort is increased if subjects can send a “smile” to the other
player instead of pressing an ordinary “ready to play” button. They find that this simple
device helps players to coordinate on a higher effort even though players are not able to
see or to talk to each other.
Furthermore, studies have shown that the effectiveness of communication differs by the
words that are used, for instance, when making a promise. Vanberg (2008) finds that
people have a preference for keeping a promise and are not driven by concerns about their
expected payoff. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) propose that people have a preference
for keeping their word per se. In contrast, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) develop the
idea that people keep promises because of guilt aversion.4 Belot et al. (2010) investigate
the effect of voluntary vs. elicited promises and find that players are roughly 50% more
likely to cooperate if they made a voluntary promise.
Lying and voting behavior
As already mentioned above, guilt is experienced by subjects if they do not keep a promise
or in other words lied about their intention which strategy they plan to play. Gneezy
(2005) uses a cheap talk sender-receiver game and shows that people’s evaluation of
whether to lie or not in a situation depends on the consequences of the lie in terms of
payoffs. Thereby not only gains achievable through lying are considered but also pos-
3In laboratory experiments free-form written communication is often used instead of face-to-face
verbal communication to be able to disentangle the effect of facial expressions from the bare content of
communication. Roth (1995) provides a survey of bargaining experiments in which the effect of face-to-
face communication is tested. The results suggest that face-to-face communication increases the chance
of reaching an agreement even further than free-form messaging.
4In related work, Miettinen and Suetens (2008) show that players feel most guilty if they commu-
nicated their intention to cooperate, but then defect while the opponent cooperates. Charness and
Dufwenberg (2010), however, show that providing subjects merely the possibility of communication by
sending the word promise or not has almost no positive effect on the cooperation rate in a trust game.
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sible losses that might occur to the other players. The fraction of liars is largest if the
resulting gains are high and the costs, i.e., losses for the other players, are low. If players
have the opportunity to costly punish the other subjects for playing selfishly, they punish
much more often if the selfish action followed a deceptive message (Brandts and Charness,
2003). Another approach to analyzing lying is made by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) who
try to figure out under which circumstances people lie. They find that the distribution
of truthful, partially truthful and untruthful people is more or less the same independent
of the stake size, the consequences of lying, learning, and the degree of anonymity.
Finally, the partner selection process taking place during the two pre-play rounds in
“Golden Balls” draws our attention to the literature on discrimination. There exists a
vast economic as well as psychological literature on racial and gender discrimination usu-
ally with the focus on the labor market (for a comprehensive survey see Altonji and
Blank, 1999). Using the data of the US television game show “The Weakest Link”, Levitt
(2004) and Anonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2005) test taste-based and information-
based theories of discrimination, determining whether contestants discriminate on the
basis of gender, age, race, and skill level. While Levitt (2004) finds some patterns consis-
tent with information-based discrimination and taste-based discrimination against older
players, Anonovics et al. (2005) reveal taste-based discrimination by women against men.
To summarize, there are various reasons to observe a different cooperation rate than the
one predicted by game theory and the one observed in laboratory experiments without
communication, high stakes, and endogenous partner selection.
3 Game show and data set
In this section we describe in detail the course of events in the game show (Section 3.1)
and the data set (Section 3.2).
3.1 Structure of the game show
The game show “Golden Balls” consists of three rounds of play with the final round being
divided into two phases.
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Round 1 The game show starts with four players5, usually two women and two men,
who are briefly introduced by the show host, i.e., the players provide some information
about themselves including their names, occupation and place of residence. Then the first
round starts: 16 golden balls are mixed, twelve of them have written a cash amount (in
£) inside and four have written the word “killer” inside. Killer balls are the worst for the
players, because these may damage the jackpot in the final round. The balls containing
a cash value are drawn from a lottery of 100 golden balls with a minimum ball value of
£10 and a maximum ball value of £75,000.6 Each player arranges the closed golden balls
in two rows of two balls in front of herself. The two balls on the front row are opened by
each player, and the revealed cash values or number of killers is common knowledge to
each player. The content of the remaining two balls is private information to each player,
i.e., the players are allowed to secretly look inside but then have to close the balls again.
Afterwards the show host asks each player to state what is inside her hidden balls. The
order in which players are asked for their statements is exogenously determined by the
show host. Some time for discussion follows, in which the players express their distrust
about each other’s statements. The discussion ends with each player secretly casting a
vote against one of the other players. On the basis of the votes, a player is eliminated
from the show.7 After the player who has to leave is determined, all players open their
hidden back row balls and thereby reveal whether they stated the truth or not. The four
balls of the leaving player are out of the game, while the remaining twelve are carried
over to round 2.
Round 2 At the beginning of the second round, two new cash balls are drawn from the
lottery and one killer ball is added. These three new balls are mixed with the remaining
twelve from round 1, and are equally distributed to the three players at random. Hence,
there are at most five killers among the 15 balls. Again the closed balls are arranged in
two rows by each player, i.e., two balls are on the front and three balls are on the back
5Endemol UK ensured us that the four players do not know each other before the show, and enter
and leave the television studio separately (they cannot make any further arrangements after the show).
6Players have only limited information about the lottery, i.e., they only know that there may be
doubles and they know the margins of the distribution. But they do not know the distribution of the
remaining 98 balls.
7The player who receives the highest number of votes has to leave the show. In case of a tie the
players having received no vote can decide which player has to leave. If all players received one vote
each, players discuss openly which player has to leave. If players do not reach a conclusion, ties are
broken arbitrarily. In round 2 it is proceeded in the same way.
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row. As in round 1 the two balls on the front row are opened and are common knowledge,
while the three balls on the back are private information. This time the players determine
themselves the order of making statements about the content of their back row balls. Like
in the first round, the players then get some time for discussion and afterwards secretly
choose a player they want to vote off. After the player to leave has been determined all
ball values are revealed, the five balls of the leaving player are out of the game, and the
final two players are identified.
Final Round The 10 balls from round 2 are carried over to the final round and one
last killer ball is added. The maximal amount the players can gain is the sum of the
highest five cash values out of the 11 balls. This amount is called the potential jackpot
and its size is announced by the show host.
In the first phase of the final round the two players successively select five of the 11 mixed
and closed balls, and these five values build the jackpot. The player who brought the
highest amount of money from round 2 to the final round starts to select one of the balls
to “bin”, i.e., to be taken out of the game, and then chooses one ball to “win”. The balls
are not opened until they have been chosen. Then it is the other player’s turn and vice
versa until five balls have been selected for the jackpot. If a player chooses a killer ball
for the jackpot the accumulated amount up to that point is reduced to one-tenth of the
original value.
In the second phase of the final round the players play a prisoner’s dilemma in which
defection is a weakly dominant strategy (see Table I).8
Table I: Weak prisoner’s dilemma
Split (C) Steal (D)
Split (C) 1
2
J , 1
2
J 0 , J
Steal (D) J , 0 0 , 0
C =̂ Cooperation, D =̂ Defection
Such a prisoner’s dilemma has three pure-strategy Nash equilibria, namely (steal, split),
8The show host explains the different outcomes of the game in each episode with the same neutral
words (for the exact wording see Supplementary Material A).
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(steal, steal), and (split, steal).9 Thus, each player has an incentive to defect, because
she is never monetarily worse off when doing so. Before the players have to decide which
strategy to play, they get some additional time, roughly 30 seconds, to discuss with each
other what they are going to do.
The dilemma game is played as follows: Each player is assigned two balls, one with the
word “steal” and one with the word “split” inside. Then both players choose one of the
balls and open it simultaneously. If both players chose the split ball, the jackpot (J) is
divided equally between the two players. If one player chooses steal and the other chooses
split, the former gets the whole jackpot and the latter receives nothing. If both chose
steal, both get nothing.
3.2 Data description
“Golden balls” was first aired on June, 18th 2007 as a late afternoon (5pm) game show
and is still running today.10 In total, we have records of 222 episodes, with 203 regular
and 19 special episodes. In the special episodes there are either (i) players that have
been on the show before and have “lost” or (ii) only players of the same sex. The regular
episodes always consist of two women and two men and all players are on the show for
the first time. Importantly, the first series (40 episodes) was filmed prior to the show’s
television premiere. Hence, all players in these episodes had no chance to observe others
playing the show.
For all episodes, we recorded variables describing the players (occupation, hometown,
gender, race, and age) and the game (all true and stated ball values in rounds 1 and 2,
the order of making statements in both rounds, votes the players received and submitted,
the potential jackpot size, values of binned balls by each player, the player’s intended
strategy11, the jackpot size, interactions of players before and in the final (handshakes,
promises), and the final decision). Table II provides an overview of the data.
9Two of the resulting Nash equilibria involve one player to cooperate. Applying the method of
iterated elimination of weakly dominant strategies, however, leaves only the (steal, steal) equilibrium,
which should be the only one observed.
10The show reaches up to 2.2 million people per episode which corresponds to a market share of 21%
(“ITV strikes teatime gold”, guardian.co.uk, July 3rd, 2007).
11Before the show starts, the players are individually and privately asked to explain which strategy
they intend to play in the final. The recorded statement is only broadcasted to the television audience,
but not to the other players or the audience in the television studio.
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Table II: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Occupation
Social Job1 (1 = social job) 0.14 0.34 0 1 887
Student (1 = student) 0.08 0.27 0 1 888
Pensioner (1 = retired) 0.03 0.17 0 1 888
Place of residence
England (1 = England, 0 = SCO, WAL, NIR, IRL) 0.85 0.36 0 1 886
Large City2 (1 = population > 268,300 ) 0.30 0.46 0 1 886
London (1 = London) 0.13 0.34 0 1 888
Gender, race, and age
Gender (1 = male) 0.50 0.50 0 1 888
Race (1 = white) 0.92 0.27 0 1 888
Age3 (1 = above 40) 0.43 0.50 0 1 888
Average cash ball in the show 5619.55 10374.12 10 75000 3108
Strategy statement4 (0 = steal, 1 = split, 2 = other) 1.08 0.86 0 2 612
Round 1
Value of open balls (balls 1 and 2)5 8802.64 13858.91 0 104000 888
Value claimed for balls 3 and 4 14265.86 13908.53 0 83000 888
Value of closed balls (balls 3 and 4) 7852.88 12315.07 0 83000 888
Number of killers in open balls 0.47 0.58 0 2 888
Number of killers claimed 0.23 0.43 0 2 888
Number of killers in closed balls 0.53 0.60 0 2 888
Player lied at least about one ball 0.53 0.50 0 1 888
Player lied at least about one value 0.32 0.47 0 1 888
Player lied at least about one killer 0.28 0.45 0 1 888
Number of killers taken to round 2 2.59 0.76 1 4 888
Round 2
Value of open balls (balls 5 and 6) 9651.32 14275.73 0 103000 666
Value claimed for balls 7, 8 and 9 18421.19 16683.73 105 95000 666
Value of closed balls (balls 7, 8 and 9) 13352.47 16291.90 0 95000 666
Number of killers in open balls 0.44 0.58 0 2 666
Number of killers claimed 0.44 0.52 0 2 666
Number of killers in closed balls 0.75 0.69 0 3 666
Player lied at least about one ball 0.45 0.50 0 1 666
Player lied at least about one value 0.23 0.42 0 1 666
Player lied at least about one killer 0.28 0.45 0 1 666
Number of killers taken to final round 2.14 0.91 0 5 666
Value of balls taken to final round 23003.79 21134.80 150 143300 666
Final round (1st phase)
Potential jackpot 51238.36 31261.51 5000 168100 444
Average cash ball 6932.27 12030.86 10 75000 1122
Number of killers 3.21 0.94 1 6 144
Number of killers to bin 1.74 0.92 0 4 144
Number of killers to win 1.47 0.88 0 4 144
Jackpot/Pot. jackpot 0.25 0.28 0.0001 1 444
Final round (2nd phase)
Jackpot 13343.03 19247.56 3 100150 444
Decision (1 = split) 0.55 0.50 0 1 444
Outcome (0 = steal/steal, 1 = steal/split, 2 = split/split) 1.09 .75 0 2 222
Money taken home 4916.96 12000.86 0 100150 444
Money taken home (steal / split) 15693.11 20087.90 3 100150 94
Money taken home (split / split) 4783.64 8440.02 1.83 43950 148
Money left on the table 14426.34 20255.76 100 92330 108
Discussion (1 = starts discussion) 0.5 0.5 0 1 444
Handshake (1 = shake hands) 0.39 0.49 0 1 444
Mutual promise (1 = say promise) 0.25 0.43 0 1 444
1 Note that we defined a social job as a job in which people care for other people, e.g., doctors, nurses, child
minders, social workers, teachers, police officers, firemen, soldiers.
2 Large cities are cities with more than 268,300 inhabitants (based on the Mid-2008 Population Estimates published
by the Office for National Statistics).
3 We estimated by personal judgment whether a player is below or above 40.
4 Players secretly make this statement about the strategy they plan to play in the final before the show starts. It
was introduced in episode 19, series 1.
5 Killer balls are counted as zero for all value variables.
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4 Strategic considerations of the players
Following the structure of the game show, we analyze the player’s incentives to behave
in a particular way. The final goal of each player has to be reaching the final round with
a jackpot as high as possible and, most importantly, facing a player who intends to split,
independently of whether the player herself prefers to steal or split. Thus, the players
have to trade off these goals against each other.
In the pre-play, players base each of their two voting decisions on exogenous as well as
endogenous criteria. We define exogenous criteria as characteristics of the players that
are determined previously to the show, e.g., the player’s age, gender, race, or place of
residence. In contrast, endogenous criteria evolve during the course of the game, and are,
for instance, the ball values dealt to the players, the order of making statements in round
2, or whether a player lied or not. Besides, the latter two criteria can be strategically
used by the players. Players may be able to signal trustworthiness, since they can de-
cide whether to lie or not about the content of their hidden back row balls. Making the
statement first in round 2 may influence the other players’ statements, e.g., if one player
confesses a killer, the others may do the same. Further, during the discussions in round 1
and 2, they can, for instance, state why they distrust a certain player and try to convince
the other players to vote this player off.
Once players reach the final round, they have to make sure that their opponent chooses
the split ball in the final decision. Players use the discussion in the final round to reas-
sure the opponent that they will cooperate, e.g., players promise each other to share the
jackpot and/or shake hands on sharing it.
To summarize, the final decision as well as the voting decisions are functions of exogenous
personal and endogenous characteristics of the players. Unfortunately, a game-theoretic
analysis of the game is not feasible because the game is too complex and strategies are
ill-defined. However, we will use the logic of backward induction to analyze the decisions
made in the game. Therefore we start with analyzing the decision in the final round and
then successively analyze the voting decisions made in round 2 and 1.
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5 Analysis of cooperative behavior in the PD
In this section we identify the influencing factors of cooperative behavior. We observe an
average cooperation rate of 54.5%, which is higher than the one found in weak prisoner’s
dilemma experiments without communication, pre-play, and high stakes (e.g., Ortmann
and Tichy, 1999). The rate is also slightly higher than the one observed in “Friend or
Foe”, another television game show experiment, (e.g., List, 2006). Further, we observe
mutual cooperation in 33.3% and successful defection in 42.3% of the cases. Unilateral
defectors take home three times as much money as mutual cooperators, £15,693 versus
£4,784, and the average amount of money left on the table due to mutual defection is
£14,426. Altogether 108 players left £1,558,045 on the table.
We will start the analysis in Section 5.1 with a discussion of the data and the variables
that may have an influence on cooperative behavior. In Section 5.2 we will test the
derived hypotheses in an empirical analysis. In addition we briefly present an alternative
approach in the Supplementary Material B.
5.1 Possible determinants of cooperative behavior
As we already pointed out in Section 2, the prisoner’s dilemma under consideration is
different in various aspects from the ones usually analyzed in the literature. In this sec-
tion we will discuss the potential impact of those differences on the observed degree of
cooperation, and present first results. The section is divided into four parts, (i) player
characteristics, (ii) stake size, (iii) communication, and (iv) pre-play, following the pre-
sentation of variables in the regression tables in Section 5.2
(i) Player characteristics
In this category we discuss variables that are exogenously determined. These are de-
mographic player characteristics, which are also used to describe opponent- and team-
characteristics, and a variable expressing the player’s experience with the show.
Experience We define the players of the first 40 episodes (series 1) as unexperienced
players. They had no chance to observe other contestants playing the game. In con-
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trast, all later episodes have been filmed after the television premiere of “Golden Balls”.
Thus one could conjecture that the experienced players are more familiar with the show
and therefore better in assessing whether cooperation or defection could be successful or
not. But from the raw data, we do not observe a substantial difference, neither in the
cooperation rate nor in the distribution of outcomes.12
Demographics Player’s demographics are defined as exogenous characteristics of a
player such as gender, age, race, place of residence, or occupation (descriptive results
are reported in Table C.1 and Table C.2 in the Supplementary Material). The relation
between demographic characteristics and social behavior seems to be rather ambiguous.
Deriving clear-cut hypotheses about the influence of these characteristics on the player’s
propensity to cooperate is therefore not possible.
Overall, there seems to be no difference between the cooperation rates of men and women.
Concerning the rate of successful cooperation we find that it is lowest for female teams
(28.6%) and highest for mixed gender teams (35.3%). The null hypothesis of no difference
between the overall cooperation rate of men and women cannot be rejected (p=0.435)
as well as the one for the mutual cooperation rate (p=0.503). Players above the age
of 40 cooperate significantly more than players below 40 (p=0.001).13 There are only
small differences in the success rates of cooperation, teams of players below 40 have the
lowest success rate. Whites are more likely to cooperate compared to non-whites, but the
difference is not significant (p=0.334).
Based on a player’s hometown, we construct variables indicating whether her place of
residence is England, London, a small or a big city (see Table II). Players living in Eng-
land cooperate significantly less than players from other parts of Great Britain (p=0.000).
In addition, if neither player lives in England the success rate of cooperation is 50.0%
versus 32.5% if both players live in England, and 33.3% if it is a mixed team. The failure
12A two-sided binomial probability test can neither reject the null hypothesis of no difference between
the cooperation rate of experienced (52.5%) and unexperienced (54,9%) players (p=0.372), nor the null
hypothesis of no difference between the probability of mutual cooperation of experienced (34,1%) and
unexperienced (30,0%) players (p=0.481), see Table C.1 and Table C.2 in the Supplementary Material.
This result is in contrast to the finding of Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) who find an effect of learning for
players in later episodes of “Friend or Foe”. All tests used in this paper are two-sided binomial probability
tests, unless stated otherwise.
13However, gender conditional on age tends to have an effect on the cooperation rate, i.e., women
below 40 cooperate more than men below 40 and vice versa for men and women over 40. Note the results
concerning age should not be attached too much weight since the age categories are merely assessed by
personal judgment.
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rate is highest for mixed teams and significantly higher than the one of English teams
(p=0.002).14
Further, decisions made in the game might have implications beyond their immediate
consequences, because the game is played in front of a large television audience and
is therefore possibly being watched by friends, family members and/or colleagues. De-
pending on the player’s occupation, it can be in her interest to appear trustworthy. For
instance, police officers act as role models for observing the law and behaving correctly,
or teachers are responsible for a moral education of children. These players have an
incentive to behave in a fair way, especially when it comes to choosing the strategy in
the prisoner’s dilemma. We identify roughly 15% of contestants with an occupation for
which their reputation is a valuable asset, and construct a variable “social job”, including
e.g., priests, policemen, firemen, childminders, and teachers. Having a social job might
influence cooperative behavior because of two different reasons. On the one hand, players
with a social job could be more cooperative because they want to show that they behave
socially responsible. On the other hand, the causality could be vice versa: Having a social
job could be a sign for being a cooperator itself, because a cooperative person chooses
a job in which she can behave according to her preferences. In that case cooperative
behavior would not be driven by the opportunity to appear trustworthy. Summarizing,
it remains unclear whether we will observe an effect of having a social job.
Social closeness The sociological literature argues that the degree of similarity be-
tween players has an impact on their social interactions. While some people might be
willing to cooperate without discrimination, others are highly suspicious of people who
are not like them and prefer to keep them at arm’s length. In many social networks, e.g.,
friendships or business relations, one observes that individuals associate disproportion-
ately with others who are similar to themselves, i.e., people are more likely to form social
ties with others who are alike. This tendency of people to relate to similar types is re-
ferred to as “homophily”, first defined by Lazarfeld and Merton (1954).15 Such motivated,
14The hypothesis of no difference between the success rates of not-English and English teams (p=0.284),
of not-English and mixed teams (p=0.454), as well as of English and mixed teams (p=0.849) cannot be
rejected. Neither can the hypothesis of no difference between the failure rates of not-English and English
teams (p=0.495) and of not-English and mixed teams (p=0.162) be rejected.
15For a survey with respect to sociology see Jackson (2008) and with respect to cooperative game theory
see van den Nouweland and Slikker (2001). Homophily is usually based on a variety of characteristics,
including gender, race, age, region and education.
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we construct an index for the closeness between players by accounting for players’ age,
gender, race, occupational status, and place of residence (England). The index ranges
from 0 to 1, weighting each component by one-fifth. For instance, if both players in the
final are male, white, have a social job and live in England, the index takes a value of 0.8.
Concerning the distribution, we observe the majority of players to have an index-value
of either 0.6 (44%) or 0.8 (32%).
(ii) Stake size
Categorizing the jackpot in five divisions (see Table C.1 and Table C.2 in the Supplemen-
tary Material) we find that the cooperation rate decreases with a step-wise increase in the
jackpot size. But, surprisingly, the rate declines sharply from 73.6% for jackpots below
£500 to roughly 50% for jackpots above £500. The difference, taking the cutoff £500, is
highly significant (p=0.000). Concerning the mutual cooperation rate, it is significantly
higher if the two players face a jackpot below the level of £500 (p=0.000). This result is
even more remarkable if one bears in mind that a stake size around £500 is already much
higher than the one used in most laboratory experiments. At the same time, however, the
cooperation rate rises with an increase in the potential jackpot, i.e., the highest possible
jackpot the players could obtain after the first phase of the final round. Hence, the effects
of the actual and the potential jackpot operate in opposite directions. One might presume
that the players’ perception of the actual jackpot depends on the potential jackpot, i.e.,
two actual jackpots equal in size will be judged differently depending on their difference
to the potential jackpot. In Table III we explore this issue further.
We depict the cooperation rate for the five different jackpot categories and within each
we split up the rate by the four categories of the potential jackpot, i.e., the difference
between the highest potential and the actual jackpot is increasing within each category.
Fixing the jackpot categories, we find that the cooperation rate almost always increases
with the size of the potential jackpot. This corroborates the idea of a biased jackpot
perception, that we will discuss in the following.
Expectation Players might build an expectation about the size of the actual jackpot
depending on the observed size of the potential jackpot. This expectation is used to
judge the size of the actual jackpot. But, computing the correct expectation is a rather
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Table III: Relation between jackpot and potential jackpot
Jackpot Potential Jackpot Split
in £ in £ Row % N
[3, 500] [5000, 30000] 62.5 32
N=72 (30000, 45000] 85.7 14
(45000, 75000] 75.0 12
(75000, 168100] 85.7 14
(500, 2500] [5000, 30000] 41.2 34
N=100 (30000, 45000] 59.5 42
(45000, 75000] 44.4 18
(75000, 168100] 100.0 6
(2500, 10000] [5000, 30000] 50.0 30
N=102 (30000, 45000] 43.3 30
(45000, 75000] 66.7 18
(75000, 168100] 58.3 24
(10000, 30000] [10000, 30000] 38.9 18
N=116 (30000, 45000] 45.7 46
(45000, 75000] 52.9 34
(75000, 168100] 55.6 18
(30000, 100150] [30000, 45000] 50.0 6
N=54 (45000, 75000] 50.0 22
(75000, 168100] 46.2 26
Note, that the difference between the jackpot and the potential jackpot is increasing with an
increasing potential jackpot per jackpot category.
difficult task if no computer is at hand. Therefore, players need some alternative method
to calculate their expectation. As mentioned before, the first 40 episodes have been
broadcasted before all other episodes were filmed. Henceforth, we assume players to take
the observed average ratio between the jackpot and the potential jackpot in series 1 as
an estimate to roughly calculate their expectation. The average jackpot in series 1 is
£13,066 which corresponds to 27.5% of the average potential jackpot of £47,526. This
ratio is multiplied by the observed potential jackpot in each episode, and determines
the players’ expected jackpot.16 Depending on whether the jackpot is above or below
the player’s expectation, the propensity to cooperate changes. The cooperation rate is
significantly higher (p=0.002) if the jackpot is below the expectation, and cooperation
is much less successful if the expectation threshold is taken, i.e., 18.4% versus 41.1% of
mutual cooperation.
16The ratio between the jackpot and the potential jackpot observed in the episodes following series 1
is 25.7% which is very similar to the ratio observed in the episodes of series 1.
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(iii) Communication
Apart from communication that takes place in round 1 and 2, and in the first phase
of the final round, players explicitly get some time to discuss the strategy they intend
to play in the prisoner’s dilemma. The players use this time to assure each other their
willingness to cooperate, i.e., to choose the split ball. As described in Section 2, studies
have shown that especially face-to-face communication, involving a mutual agreement
to cooperate, increases the cooperation rate significantly. We observe that 24.8% of the
players voluntarily promise each other to cooperate. In addition to verbal communication,
39.2% of the players shake hands to corroborate their intention to split, and 41.4% out
of those do both, i.e., they shake hands and promise each other to share the jackpot. We
define dummy variables to control for mutual promises, handshakes and for whether the
contestant starts the final discussion. We expect handshakes and promises to increase
successful cooperation.
(iv) Pre-play
The next three potential determinants of cooperative behavior evolve within the pre-play.
Lying Lying is rather common during the pre-play rounds of the game show and might
be thought of as an inherent part of the game. Players are concerned about maximizing
the stake size, thus having low values or killer balls increases the probability of being
voted off. Driven by the fear of being eliminated from the game when having “bad” balls,
the contestants bluff their way to the final. But a player is revealed as a liar after each
round, and might get a reputation of being not trustworthy, which possibly prevents her
from lying. Analyzing our raw data, we find that 43% of the players who reach the
final lied about the content of their balls in round 1 and 37% in round 2. A possible
implication of lying could be that liars may want to repay their “guilt” and therefore
are more tempted to cooperate. But a player who has not lied might perceive a liar as
untrustworthy per se and thus is less willing to cooperate. We control for the potential
effects of lying by introducing dummy variables for whether the player or her opponent
has lied about a cash value or a killer during the two rounds of pre-play, since we believe
that the perception of concealing a killer may differ from that about overstating a cash
amount.
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Kindness In addition, we include variables linked to kindness, experienced kindness,
and its repayment in our analysis. Firstly, we account for the impact of the voting decision
on the behavior of those contestants who remain in the show. After each round of the
pre-play, contestants need to secretly cast a vote against a certain player whom they want
to leave the game. It can happen that a player in the final has voted against her opponent
during the pre-play. This might influence the player’s behavior in the final: A player is
less likely to cooperate, since she expressed her dislike against the other player before.
In this respect we construct a dummy variable that identifies a player who voted against
her opponent.
Secondly, we define a variable termed “should have left the game” in order to investigate
whether a player responds to experienced kindness. The variable is constructed as follows:
First we rank the three players in round 2 with respect to their weighted sum of cash
values and killer balls. The dummy points at the player with the lowest weighted sum.
From a purely monetary perspective, this player should be voted off the game. But if
such a player nevertheless reaches the final round, she is aware of owing her “survival”
to her opponent.17 In this respect one could surmise that she is more likely to split the
jackpot in order to pay back her survival.
Luck At last, we want to focus on the first phase of the final round, in which the
jackpot is built by an alternating selection of balls. The player who starts to select the
first balls to bin and win is the player who brought along the higher sum of cash values,
i.e., contributed most to the potential jackpot. The mean difference between the player’s
contributions is £1,678 without accounting for the possible damage caused by killer balls.
The value of the resulting jackpot is determined purely at random, but one player might
be more lucky than the other, i.e., chooses higher values or bins more killer balls. We
control for those effects, constructing three dummy variables: One for the player who
contributes most to the potential jackpot, one for the player who selects the highest
values, and one for the player who bins most killer balls. These players could feel entitled
to a larger piece of the pie and are therefore less likely to cooperate. This would be in
line with the findings on entitlement and fairness of Rutstro¨m and Williams (2000).
17In order to rank the players we use the ex-post cash-killer-criterion which is described and discussed
in detail in Section 6. We assume that a player, who does have the lowest weighted monetary amount is
aware of this and does value her survival. Often the players address their pass to the final round during
the final discussion and thank their opponent for having taken her so far.
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5.2 Regression analysis
In order to explore the individual decision process when playing the prisoner’s dilemma
game, we estimate bivariate probits of the probability that player i chooses split or steal
as a function of own and opponents’ characteristics as well as variables determined in the
pre-play (see Table IV).18 Additionally, to analyze team cooperation rates, we estimate
ordered probits (see Table V and Table C.3 in the Supplementary Material). We order
the outcomes by coding the team outcome as equaling 0 if both players choose steal,
equaling 1 if one player chooses steal and the other chooses split, and equaling 2 if both
players choose split.
Results for unilateral cooperation
We estimate bivariate probits on the probability that player i chooses split (y = 1), or
steal (y = 0) as a non-linear function of exogenous demographic player characteristics, D,
and variables that evolved during the game, G, including a constant and one interaction
term, namely the interaction of “handshakes”, x1, and “promise”, x2. The conditional
probability that player i chooses split is
P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G) = Φ(α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Dθ +Gν) = Φ(m),
where α, β, θ, ν are parameters to be estimated, Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, and m denotes the index α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Dθ +Gν.
The marginal effect for the k-th independent variable is computed as
∂P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G)
∂xk
= φ(m)βk k = 2, ..., K
18In addition, we estimate the same probits including one additional dummy variable, namely whether
player i “voted against (her) opponent” in the pre-play which results in a significantly negative effect on
cooperation. We exclude the dummy in our main analysis, since including it reduces the data set by 55
observations which is due to a voting result of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 or 1:1:1 in round 2 (in these cases it is
analytically not possible to trace back the players’ individual voting decision). Except for the episodes
with a tie, the outcome of the voting decision is 2:1:0 in round 2, such that none of the final players
received a vote from their opponent. Thus, the control variable only comprises of the voting result in
round 1. Additionally, we can only control for the voting decision made by the particular player herself,
and not whether this player received a vote by her opponent in the final, since after round 1 the players
can only speculate who had cast a vote against them. Therefore we can only identify 18 out of 390 players
to have casted a vote against her final opponent. Thus, the variable “voted against (her) opponent” has
not much explanatory power.
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where φ(·) is the standard normal density function. The magnitude of the derivative
is proportional to φ(m)βk. A change in one of the independent variables results in an
effective percentage change in player i’s likelihood to cooperate.19
Table IV reports the estimation results of four probit models, which differ with respect to
the included variables in the group of stake size and pre-play. Model (1) and (3) include
the continuous variables jackpot and potential jackpot, while models (2) and (4) include
the dummy variable describing whether the expectation of the resulting jackpot is met
or not. In addition to the controls for personal players’ demographics, stake size, and
communication, in models (3) and (4) variables determined in the pre-play are introduced.
Throughout, addressing demographics, we find that age, whether a player lives in Eng-
land, or whether both players live in a small city have a significant effect on the likelihood
to cooperate. If player i is above the age of 40, she is about 16% more likely to coop-
erate, i.e., split. But, a player who lives in England, compared to any other part of
Great Britain, is roughly 27% more likely to be a defector, i.e., steal. Additionally, if
both final players live in a small city, then player i’s likelihood to cooperate decreases
by up to 14%. All three effects are very robust with approximately the same magnitude
across the four models. The results on players’ gender, race, and occupational status,
however, exhibit no significant effects. We also find no effect for player i’s experience,
i.e., the control for the first series has no significant effect, indicating that players are not
able to profit from a learning effect if they could watch the game show on television before.
The results on stake size support our findings gained in Section 5.1: As suggested, the
higher the actual jackpot, the less likely player i cooperates; while, the higher the poten-
tial jackpot, the more likely player i cooperates. In addition models (2) and (4) highlight
our descriptive finding that a player is more willing to cooperate if the actual jackpot is
19If xk is a dummy variable, the marginal effect is computed as the discrete difference
4P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G)
4xk = Φ(m|xk = 1)− Φ(m|xk = 0), k = 2, ...,K.
Note that the marginal effect of the interacted dummy variable “handshakes” (x1) and “promise” (x2) is
equal to the discrete double difference
42P (y = 1|x1, x2, D,G)
4x14x2 = Φ(m)− Φ(β1 + α+Dθ +Gν)− Φ(β2 + α+Dθ +Gν) + Φ(α+Dθ +Gν).
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Table IV: Results from binary probit on unilateral cooperation (1)
y = 1 (Split) Marginal Effects
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Player Characteristics
Unexperienced -0.028 (0.069) -0.050 (0.069) -0.019 (0.074) -0.041 (0.073)
Male -0.018 (0.059) -0.017 (0.058) -0.019 (0.060) -0.018 (0.060)
Age (>40) 0.164*** (0.064) 0.161** (0.063) 0.174*** (0.066) 0.172*** (0.065)
White 0.117 (0.148) 0.113 (0.145) 0.052 (0.147) 0.046 (0.143)
England -0.269*** (0.078) -0.267*** (0.077) -0.274*** (0.082) -0.271*** (0.081)
London 0.001 (0.103) 0.003 (0.100) -0.059 (0.107) -0.066 (0.104)
Large City -0.054 (0.077) -0.051 (0.075) -0.024 (0.081) -0.018 (0.080)
Student -0.009 (0.096) 0.001 (0.095) -0.020 (0.095) -0.014 (0.095)
Pensioner -0.143 (0.160) -0.160 (0.163) -0.126 (0.164) -0.145 (0.167)
Social Job (Reputation) -0.017 (0.087) -0.032 (0.087) -0.016 (0.090) -0.033 (0.090)
Team Characteristics
Index (Social Closeness) 0.458 (0.309) 0.469 (0.306) 0.592* (0.322) 0.606* (0.318)
Team Male -0.147 (0.099) -0.152 (0.097) -0.183* (0.100) -0.184* (0.097)
Team Female -0.054 (0.095) -0.058 (0.095) -0.083 (0.097) -0.084 (0.097)
Team Age> 40 -0.011 (0.103) -0.009 (0.103) -0.007 (0.106) -0.001 (0.107)
Team Age< 40 -0.049 (0.091) -0.055 (0.090) -0.073 (0.095) -0.075 (0.093)
Team White -0.118 (0.122) -0.124 (0.118) -0.108 (0.124) -0.116 (0.121)
Team England -0.019 (0.093) -0.001 (0.093) -0.021 (0.097) -0.002 (0.096)
Team Large City -0.127 (0.101) -0.128 (0.100) -0.147 (0.101) -0.145 (0.101)
Team Small City -0.141** (0.067) -0.127* (0.067) -0.143** (0.069) -0.126* (0.068)
Opponent Characteristics
Opp. Student 0.087 (0.097) 0.095 (0.095) 0.107 (0.098) 0.111 (0.097)
Opp. Pensioner 0.067 (0.162) 0.049 (0.159) 0.053 (0.171) 0.032 (0.168)
Opp. Social Job 0.040 (0.085) 0.027 (0.085) 0.087 (0.086) 0.073 (0.086)
Stake Size
log(Jackpot) -0.057*** (0.014) -0.057*** (0.015)
log(Pot. Jackpot) 0.097** (0.048) 0.077 (0.050)
Jackpot < Expectation 0.162*** (0.056) 0.173*** (0.059)
Communication
Started Discussion -0.008 (0.048) -0.009 (0.047) -0.005 (0.049) -0.006 (0.049)
Handshakes -0.151** (0.067) -0.179*** (0.066) -0.167** (0.068) -0.196*** (0.067)
Promise -0.032 (0.108) -0.063 (0.107) -0.060 (0.109) -0.095 (0.108)
Handshakes*Promise 0.281** (0.139) 0.309** (0.170) 0.339** (0.142) 0.372*** (0.054)
Pre-play
Acc. Most Money -0.098* (0.058) -0.099* (0.057)
Selected Higher Values in Bin/Win -0.148* (0.079) -0.157** (0.077)
Binned Most Killers in Bin/Win -0.091 (0.090) -0.092 (0.088)
Lied About Cash Value -0.105* (0.059) -0.106* (0.059)
Lied About Killer -0.018 (0.055) -0.017 (0.055)
Opp. Lied About Cash Value 0.019 (0.058) 0.014 (0.058)
Opp. Lied About Killer -0.048 (0.056) -0.041 (0.055)
“Should Have Left The Game” 0.133** (0.062) 0.144** (0.061)
Wald X 2 61.23*** 55.18*** 74.06*** 69.14***
Log-Likelihood -273.26 -277.81 -264.75 -268.63
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11
N 441 441 440 440
Number of Clusters 222 222 222 222
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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below her expectation, i.e., her likelihood to cooperate significantly increases by roughly
16%. All effects are independent of player’s characteristics or communication, and are
highly robust.
Addressing the controls for communication, we find that neither starting the final discus-
sion nor voluntarily promising each other to cooperate are significant determinants. But,
we find a negative effect of shaking hands: If both final contestants shake hands dur-
ing the final discussion, each player actually is more likely to defect. Thus, handshakes
seem to serve as an instrument to manipulate the opponent’s attitude towards coop-
eration. Whether shaking hands is perceived differently depending on a promise made
at the same time, we interact both dummy variables. As the results show, we find a
positive significant interaction effect: Shaking hands in combination with a promise actu-
ally increases the player’s likelihood to cooperate. We will further explore whether these
effects help cooperators to coordinate by looking at team outcomes in the next subsection.
In models (3) and (4) we introduce controls describing pre-play determinants. We find
that a lie about a cash value is treated differently with respect to its influence on coop-
eration. If player i lied about a cash value, she is roughly 10% more likely to defect in
the prisoner’s dilemma, but concealing a killer has no effect, neither does a lie of her op-
ponent. Regarding the control indicating that player i should have left the game before,
player i is roughly 14% more likely to cooperate. As hypothesized a player who should
have been voted off the game, but nevertheless made it to the final, is likely to pay back
the opponents’ confidence. Further, we find that both, having accumulated more money
as well as having selected the higher values when building the jackpot, have a signifi-
cantly negative impact on the players’ likelihood to cooperate. As suggested, a player
might feel entitled to a larger piece of the pie, since she contributed more to the stake
size. Testing for any interaction effect with respect to a player’s expectation, we find that
a player who accumulated more money to the jackpot and whose expectation is not met,
is significantly more likely to steal. This result suggests that a player’s perception of the
jackpot is correlated with her contribution to the potential jackpot.
Besides, the introduction of the pre-play controls results in two additional effects regard-
ing team characteristics. We find that a male player is significantly less likely to cooperate
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with a male opponent, indicating that men are more competitive when facing the same
sex. Another significant determinant of cooperative behavior is the index of social close-
ness between players. The more similar both final players are with respect to their age,
gender, race, and place of residence, the more likely player i is to cooperate with her
opponent. This finding suggests, that in-group biases may be present.
Results for mutual cooperation
To understand why players arrive at different outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma, we
estimate ordered probit models. We observe the discrete variable y that can take on three
values, i.e., it equals 0 if both players choose steal, it equals 1 if one player chooses steal
and the other chooses split, and it equals 2 if both players choose split. The boundaries
between the three cases are determined by the threshold (ξi), which needs to be estimated
along with the rest of the parameters. The probabilities of the three events y = 0; 1; 2 are
given by P (y = 0) = Φ(ξ1−m), P (y = 1) = Φ(ξ2−m)−Φ(ξ1−m), P (y = 2) = Φ(m−ξ2),
where m = α+ β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Dθ +Gν. The marginal effect of dk (gk) for the
j−th response is computed as20
∂P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G)
∂xk
= [φ(ξj−1 −m)− φ(ξj −m)]βk.
The results for the three different outcomes are presented in Table V and Table C.3 in
the Supplementary Material.
20If dk (gk) is a dummy variable, then the marginal effect is computed as the discrete difference
4P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G) = P (y = j|(x1, x2, D,G) +4xk)− P (y = j|(x1, x2, D,G)).
Note that the marginal effects of the variables that are interacted involve the coefficient of the interaction
term. Therefore, the marginal effect of x1 (analog for x2) for the j-th response is calculated as
∂P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G)
∂x1
= [φ(ξj−1 −m)− φ(ξj −m)](β1 + β12x2);
and the magnitude of the interaction effect for the j-th response is given by
∂P (y = j|x1, x2, D,G)
∂x1∂x2
= [φ(ξj−1 −m)− φ(ξj −m)]β12 − [φ′(ξj−1 −m)− φ′(ξj −m)](β1 + β12x2)(β2 + β12x1),
where φ′(·) denotes the first derivative of the normal density function w.r.t. its argument. Standard
errors are computed by the delta method.
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Table V: Results from ordered probit on outcomes in the PD (1)
y = 0; 1; 2 Marginal Effects
Steal/Steal (0) Split/Steal (1) Split/Split (2)
Team Characteristics
Team Unexperienced 0.000 (0.063) 0.000 (0.013) 0.000 (0.077)
Team Male 0.091 (0.089) 0.006 (0.011) -0.097 (0.083)
Team Female 0.010 (0.064) 0.002 (0.012) -0.012 (0.075)
Team > 40 -0.068 (0.065) -0.023 (0.032) 0.091 (0.096)
Team < 40 0.103 (0.066) 0.012 (0.011) -0.115 (0.070)
Team England 0.121** (0.050) 0.041 (0.026) -0.162** (0.071)
Team Small City 0.079 (0.048) 0.016 (0.013) -0.095 (0.058)
Index (Social Closeness) -0.302* (0.162) -0.063 (0.635) 0.364* (0.195)
Pre-Play
Team Never Lied -0.046 (0.059) -0.013 (0.022) 0.059 (0.081)
Team Lying 0.028 (0.053) 0.005 (0.010) -0.033 (0.063)
Communication
Handshakes 0.078 (0.054) 0.016* (0.009) -0.094 (0.058)
Promise -0.081 (0.053) 0.127*** (0.016) 0.098 (0.064)
Handshakes*Promise -0.295** (0.129) 0.029 (0.046) 0.324** (0.137)
Stake Size
log(Jackpot) 0.051*** (0.013) 0.011 (0.107) -0.062*** (0.015)
log(Pot. Jackpot) -0.081* (0.043) -0.017 (0.178) 0.098* (0.051)
Wald X 2 36.90***
Log-Likelihood -219.55
Pseudo R2 0.08
N 54 94 74
Number of Clusters 222
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Concerning team characteristics, Table V shows that teams of English players are more
likely to defect. But the more similar both team players are with respect to their age,
gender, race, and place of residence, i.e., the higher the index value, the more likely
they manage to successfully cooperate. Addressing the division of team by gender, age
or having lied in the pre-play, there are no considerable differences. The results also
highlight the significance of handshakes and promises. Teams that shake hands or promise
each other to cooperate, are more likely to miscoordinate. In addition, handshakes in
combination with a promise increase the likelihood of mutual cooperation and decrease
the one of mutual defection. As the analysis of the raw data suggests, we find a highly
significant and inverse effect of the actual and potential jackpot. Both players are 5% more
likely to defect when the stakes are large, and are 6% less likely to cooperate. In contrast,
teams are almost 10% more likely to cooperate when the potential jackpot increases. The
results in Table C.3 (Supplementary Material) support the discussed findings, highlighting
that the players’ expectation about the stake size is also a significant influencing factor
of mutual cooperation. If both players’ expectation about the jackpot is above the actual
one, they are 17% more likely to cooperate, but 16% more likely to defect.
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Summary We identify various player characteristics (e.g., age, living in England, or
social closeness), stakes size, and communication, as well as pre-play to be significant
influencing factors of unilateral and mutual cooperation. Most noticeable we find a robust
and substantial negative effect of the actual stake size on cooperation, i.e., the higher the
jackpot the more likely players are to defect. Controlling for the effect of handshakes and
voluntarily stated promises we find that players who shake hands are more likely to defect,
while handshakes in combination with a promise are likely to result in cooperation and
successful coordination. Both effects are robust and independent of player characteristics
and pre-play determinants. We are not aware of any other study having shown similar
effects.
6 Pre-play decision making: Voting behavior
As the results from the probit regressions suggest, the opponents’ characteristics play
a decisive role for cooperative behavior. Therefore, we now draw our attention to the
pre-prisoner’s dilemma play, i.e., the selection of the two finalists. Starting with four
contestants, each player faces the decision for whom to vote to leave the game in round
1 and 2. The players’ voting behavior will be a function of observable characteristics
and subjective criteria that maybe inconsistent with one another: Firstly, players have
powerful monetary incentives and would like to vote off the player who has the lowest
cash values or most killers in her golden balls. But, at the same time, players need to
evaluate the opponent’s character in view of the final round, i.e., assess her trustworthi-
ness, sympathy, or susceptibility to manipulation. Finally, the players need to vote in a
way that increases their own survival, thus their optimal action depends critically on the
belief about how other players vote.
In the next three sections we will show how the players balance their voting decision,
bearing in mind the stake size, the opponent’s character and their own survival. In section
6.1, we discuss the expected voting behavior with the help of three objective evaluation
criteria. In Section 6.2 we briefly describe the impact of personal player characteristics
as well as round-specific determinants. Finally, in Section 6.3 we empirically test the
validity of the objective criteria.
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6.1 Objective criteria
Each episode, before the players have to decide against whom to cast a vote, the show
host reminds the players to “keep in the cash, and kick out the killers”. Following this
prompt, we describe the player’s voting decision by means of three objective criteria
assuming that it is a player’s aim to maximize the potential stake size. Each episode and
round these criteria predict one particular player who should be voted off: The cash-
(CC) and cash-killer-criterion (CKC) are constructed on the basis of the (weighted)
monetary values of balls and declare the player with the lowest amount of money to be
voted to leave the game. While we count a killer ball as a ball with zero value in the
CC, we attach the killer balls a weight of 0.1 in the CKC, i.e., one killer ball reduces
the monetary value to one-tenth of the original value, a second killer ball reduces it to
one-hundredth of the original value and so forth. The killer-criterion (KC) focuses on
the number of killer balls per player, and accordingly declares the player with the highest
number of killers to be voted off.
Further, within each criterion we distinguish three different time-dimensions, i.e., we
determine the prediction of each criterion separately taking into account (i) the two
opened balls on the front row (ex-ante), (ii) the two open balls and the statements of
the hidden back row balls (stated), and (iii) all revealed balls (ex-post21).
By means of these three, respectively nine criteria, we analyze to what extent each crite-
rion explains the player’s voting decision within and between round 1 and 2. Descriptive
results are reported in Table C.4, Table C.5, and Table C.6 in the Supplementary Mate-
rial.22
First we want to look at the proportions of players who are effectively voted off in line
with the three criteria (see Table C.4 in the Supplementary Material). Focusing on the
time-division of each criterion, in round 1 we find that most players vote in line with the
prediction of the ex-ante CKC and ex-ante CC, as well as of the stated KC. In round 2
instead, the ex-post CKC and the ex-post CC dominate, but the stated KC again yields
the best prediction. Overall the KC, especially when looking at the stated values, fits
21The ex-post criteria serve to test whether the players use the ex-ante criteria as a best estimation of
the true state.
22Note that we exclude those episodes which have a voting result of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 or a tie in round
2, since it is analytical impossible to reconstruct the players’ individual decision. Additionally, in Table
C.5 and Table C.6 we restrict the sample to only those players who take part in both rounds (with an
almost equal share of males (48.5%) and females (51.5%)); thereby we can compare the voting results
for both rounds taking the same player’s decisions into account.
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best: In round 1, 81.1% of players who are voted off have the highest number of killer
balls both on their front row as well as stated on their hidden back row balls; in round 2
this proportion slightly reduces to 70.3%, but still exceeds the CC and CKC.
The findings are confirmed when considering for each criterion the proportions of players
who received a vote when predicted, additionally distinguished by gender (see Table C.5
in the Supplementary Material).
As above, we focus on the time-dimension of each criterion and find that the players most
frequently vote in line with the ex-ante CKC and CC in round 1, but in line with the
ex-post CKC and CC in round 2. Concerning the KC, players vote in line with the stated
KC in round 1 and the ex-ante KC in round 2. Separating these findings by gender, we
observe that significantly more males than females vote in line with the stated KC and
ex-ante CKC in round 1 (p = 0.024 and p = 0.034) whereas in round 2 more females vote
in line with the ex-post CC (p = 0.021).
Most noticeable, in both rounds the players take the statements about killer balls seri-
ously, although one might argue that statements are only cheap talk and should therefore
be ignored. But a statement about a killer ball has to be treated different from stating a
particular value. In our setting, players have a strong incentive to lie about a killer ball,
since it threatens them progressing in the game. If players nevertheless state to have one,
this message is “self-signaling” and not cheap talk: If a player states to have a killer ball
it is the truth.
A first result is that players seem to base their voting decision on objective criteria, but
switch within the time-dimension of the criteria from round 1 to 2. This switch maybe
explained by the different amount of information a player has at a certain time.
Information based separability of players
In the two pre-play rounds the players have different information about the distribution
of values. In round 1, the players face a situation in which they base their voting decision
on an ambiguous distribution of outcomes, i.e., only the values of the revealed front row
balls are common knowledge. In round 2 the players have additional information. After
the voting decision in round 1, all contestants need to reveal their true values on the back
row. The twelve balls carried over from round 1 to round 2 are now common knowledge to
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all remaining contestants, and only the two new added cash values are unknown. Hence,
a player can be in two different states: First, if both new values are within the revealed
balls on the front row, or a particular player has at least one new value on her hidden
back row and the other is observable on any other player’s front row, she knows the exact
distribution of values in play. From an informational point of view a player who knows
all ball values in play, makes her voting decision in a situation where only the precise
allocation of each value is uncertain. Second, if both new values remain unobservable, a
player again lacks information, but not as much as in round 1.23 Thus, using the state-
ments about the hidden ball values, the players are able to infer - up to a certain extent
- whether a contestant lies.
We expect that a player, who faces uncertainty about the allocation of balls makes her
voting decision in consideration of all “true”values, and weights the utility of the outcome
by the probability of obtaining it. These players tend to vote by means of the ex-post
criteria. This effect should be more pronounced compared to the one observe for players
in a situation of ambiguity. Here, they should vote most frequently by means of the
ex-ante criteria.
In what follows we refer to Table C.6 in the Supplementary Material that presents propor-
tions of the players’ voting decision by means of the three criteria and its time-divisions
as well as player’s informational background. We restrict the data set to compare the
same 573 players in round 1 and 2, of which we identify 50 players to be in an uncertain
state, and 241 players to be in an ambiguous one in round 2. In round 1 all 573 players
are in the same ambiguous situation.
As suggested, we find that the proportion of uncertain players who vote in line with the
ex-post CKC is significantly higher (p=0.004 and p=0.000) than of ambiguous players.
Additionally, the spread between proportions of players who consider the ex-post or the
stated prediction within the CKC is much larger for players facing uncertainty than
23We also analyzed the case when only one of the new ball values is known to a player, termed
partial ambiguity (see Table C.6 in the Supplementary Material). But for the sake of clarity we limit
the discussion to the cases when both new values are either known or not. Naturally the extent of
information about a state’s probability influences the players’ willingness to bet on the state. Camerer
and Weber (1992) review the empirical and theoretical literature on ambiguity in decision making.
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ambiguity.24 This indicates that those players are able to infer which player overstates
her hidden values on the back row, and in return cast a vote against her. The KC is again
special, firstly, due to the self-signaling message when stating a killer ball, and secondly
because the number of killer balls seem to be the strongest determinant for player’s voting
behavior.
Summary With the help of the time-dimension within the three criteria we find a
possibility to explain the decision making of more than two thirds of the players. The
players’ decision may origin in an objective evaluation of their opponents, giving most
weight to killer balls. Given the predictions of all criteria, we find contrary voting patterns
due to informational differences between both rounds of pre-play, i.e., players switch from
ex-ante criteria in round 1 to ex-post criteria in round 2.25
6.2 Subjective criteria and pre-play determinants
Regarding players’ choice of their counterpart for the final round, besides the objective
criteria, subjective personal valuations as well as observed behavior in the first two rounds
are likely to play a decisive role.
First, it is likely that people have different “tastes” for others. We find that women are
more likely to vote against men and vice versa. In round 1, males cast a vote against
females in 65% and females against males in even 75%. The difference to vote against the
opposite sex is highly significant (p = 0.000). In round 2 we find that only females are
more likely to cast a vote against males (52%, p = 0, 096), but that males are significantly
more likely to vote against their same sex (54%, p = 0, 064). This finding suggests that
in-group biases may be prevalent, especially in round 1.26 Apart from gender differences,
we find that non-whites reach the final round significantly less frequently: 63% of non-
whites do not reach the final (p = 0.000).
24For instance, in round 2 70% of all player facing uncertainty vote by means of the stated CKC, but
only 55% of all players in round 1, compared to 64% of players facing ambiguity in round 2. The same
holds for the ex-post CKC, as well as for males and females in both criteria. Besides we find a different
voting pattern for males and females facing uncertainty : A much larger proportion of males votes in line
with the ex-ante CC and CKC than females in round 2, while these are almost equal when players are
ambiguous, or in round 1.
25Over the whole sample, we find only 22 contestants (2.8%) who do not vote in line with neither
criterion, and only 65 contestants (8.3%) who never vote in line with an ex-ante criterion.
26In addition, we find that males receive a vote more frequently than females. In round 1, 55% of
males receive a vote (p = 0.000), in round 2 53% (p = 0.012).
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Second, we ask whether the order in which players announce the content of their hidden
balls impacts on the players’ voting decision. The determination of the order differs
between rounds: In round 1, the show host calls on a particular player to start telling
what is on her hidden back row balls. Usually this is the player with the weakest front
row. Thus, in round 1 the order of statements is exogenously determined by the show
host. In round 2 instead it is endogenous. The show host asks the players who wants to
open up the round. On the one hand starting to report the content of the hidden back row
balls helps to state high values, especially if it is the truth, and thereby turning the focus
on the opponents’ balls. On the other hand, the player who begins to state her hidden
values cannot make her statement dependent on her opponents’ statements, e.g., if all
other players confess to have a killer ball a player who states her values afterward might
be more likely to confess a killer as well. After round 2, we observe that only 26.1% of
the players who announce first are effectively voted to leave the game, but the second or
third player is voted off in 38.7% and 35.1%, respectively.27 Therefore, we expect that the
order in round 2 has explanatory content in the sense that a player has a lower propensity
to receive a vote or is less likely voted off if she makes her statement first. In round 1 we
do not expect the order to have additional explanatory power, since the player is either
selected randomly or due to her weak front row. The effect of a weak front row on the
likelihood of receiving a vote is already captured by the objective criteria.
6.3 Regression analysis
In this section we determine which of the objective as well as subjective determinants,
explain the observed voting pattern best and thus affect a player’s survival within the
two rounds of pre-play. Addressing the objective criteria, which we discussed in Section
6.1, we construct variables for each criterion and their corresponding time-dimension. For
each criterion the variables are composed of (i) the sum of the two open balls, (ii) the sum
of the stated values on the back row, and (iii) a dummy indicating whether the player
made a truthful statement about her hidden back row balls or not.
We expect that the values or number of killers in the open balls on a player’s front row
affect the decision about whom to cast a vote against in both rounds. But, the statements
27The test for the difference between the order of statements is highly significant between the first and
second player (p = 0.000), and the first and third player (p = 0.001). There is no difference between
being the second or third announcer (p = 0.241).
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of the hidden back row balls are only considered in the voting decision in round 2, since in
round 2 the players have some information about their possible content. More precisely,
the higher the amount of cash in the two open balls, the more likely a player survives the
pre-play, but the more killer balls a player has, the more likely she is eliminated from the
game.
In addition, we control for whether it is a good strategy of players to tell the truth about
the content of their hidden back row balls. Although in round 1 the players have no
information about the distribution of balls in play, an honest player might be able to
convince the others that her statement is true, because she is e.g., not nervous. Further,
we control for the effect of lying by including a dummy “lied in round 1” in the regression
for round 2, i.e., the dummy indicates whether a player lied in round 1. A player who lied
in round 1 takes the risk of getting a reputation of being untrustworthy, which she may
suffer from in round 2. We observe that a substantial amount of players lies in round 1
(53%) as well as in round 2 (45%). The average overstatement is £6,413 in round 1, and
£5,069 in round 2.
Concerning the subjective criteria and pre-play determinants (Section 6.2), we control
for the effects of players’ age, gender, race, and place of residence as well as the effects
of lying and the order of statements in the regression analysis. We expect that voting
incentives switch between rounds such that players attach more weight to the objective
criteria in round 1, and in round 2 shift weight to personal judgment about the opponent’s
sympathy or trustworthiness with regard to the final.
We estimate a probit on the likelihood that a player is voted off the game (see Table VI) as
well as an ordered probit where we look at the determinants impacting on the likelihood a
player receives 0,1,2, or 3 votes in round 1 (see Table C.7 in the Supplementary Material),
and 0,1, or 2 votes in round 2 (see Table C.8 in the Supplementary Material). In all
regressions we simultaneously control for the CC and KC (model (1)), and separately for
the CKC (model (2)), which is a mix between the other two. Again, we present marginal
effects instead of coefficient estimates.
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Table VI: Binary Probits on Voting Behavior in Round 1 and 2
yi = 1 (player i has to leave the show)
Round 1 Marginal Effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Player Characteristics
Male 0.040 (0.035) 0.040 (0.035)
Age > 40 -0.002 (0.035) -0.004 (0.034)
White -0.117* (0.067) -0.109* (0.066)
England 0.023 (0.044) 0.023 (0.043)
Order of Statements 0.024 (0.042) 0.028 (0.041)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.031*** (0.011)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.002 (0.017)
Truthful Statements -0.146*** (0.049)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.142*** (0.036)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.040 (0.046)
Truthful Statements -0.091** (0.042)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Whgt. Value Open Balls) -0.074*** (0.006)
log(Whgt. Value Stated Balls) -0.003 (0.010)
Truthful Statements -0.068** (0.033)
Wald X 2 161.47*** 232.20***
Log-Likelihood -360.51 -364.04
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.23
N 842 842
Number of clusters 211 211
Round 2 Marginal Effects
Model (1) Model (2)
Player Characteristics
Male 0.027 (0.045) 0.026 (0.044)
Age > 40 0.051 (0.045) 0.055 (0.044)
White -0.123 (0.084) -0.110 (0.082)
England 0.050 (0.049) 0.051 (0.049)
Order of Statements -0.101** (0.046) -0.097** (0.046)
Lied in Round 1 0.057 (0.038) 0.055 (0.038)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.031*** (0.011)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.002 (0.017)
Truthful Statements -0.146*** (0.049)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.052 (0.049)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.071* (0.040)
Truthful Statements -0.147*** (0.049)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.034*** (0.008)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.020* (0.012)
Truthful Statements -0.191*** (0.041)
Wald X 2 61.55*** 69.99***
Log-Likelihood -368.25 -367.39
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09
N 631 631
Number of Clusters 211 211
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: 11 special episodes in which all players have the same sex are excluded.
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Results
Looking at model (1) and (2) in Table VI, we find a significant race effect in round 1.
Non-whites are voted off more frequently than whites. In round 2, the race effect disap-
pears. But other personal player characteristics, as gender, age or place of residence, have
no impact on the likelihood that a player is voted off the game in both rounds. Thus, the
gender differences described in Section 6.2 seem to cancel out each other.
Addressing the order in which players make their statements each round, making a state-
ment first has a significant impact on the likelihood to be voted to leave the game in
round 2: If a player decides to state the content of her hidden back row balls first, the
likelihood to stay in the game increases by roughly 10%. Thus our hypothesis of making
the statement first allows players to credibly state “good” balls, is supported. As sug-
gested, there is no significant effect of the order of statements in round 1.
Apart from that, we find no significant effect on the probability of being voted off in
round 2 if a player lied in round 1, independent of the lie’s content (overstatement or
concealing a killer).
The variables representing the objective criteria have a strong explanatory power, with
the highest Pseudo R2 in model (2). As expected, concerning the open ball values on a
players’ front row, the higher the cash amount the lower a player’s likelihood to be voted
off. The reverse it true when addressing killer balls. The higher the number of killer
balls in the open balls, the more likely a player is voted to leave the game. The state-
ments about the hidden back row balls have no effect in round 1, and in round 2 only a
statement about a killer ball is significant. This supports our suggestion that statements
about cash values are meaningless, but that statements about killer balls are taken into
account in the players’ voting decision: Confessing a killer ball increases the likelihood
of being voted off the game. Further, the variable indicating whether a player stated the
truth, either about her hidden back row cash values or killer balls has a significant effect.
In both rounds it is worthwhile to be honest, stating the truth reduces the likelihood to
be voted off by roughly 10%. In round 2, the effect is even more pronounced, which might
be due to the players’ informational advantage about the ball values in play. Although
the players have no information about the distribution of the hidden ball values in round
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1, a player who states the truth seems to be able to signal credibility.28
For a more detailed analysis of the voting process, we draw our attention to the results
from the ordered probit estimation, see Table C.7 and Table C.8 in the Supplementary
Material. There we can identify the effects on the number of votes a player receives.
Overall, the results provided by the probit estimation above are confirmed.29 In addition,
we find that whether a player lied in round 1 matters for the probability of receiving zero
or two votes in round 2. A player who lied before receives two votes 6% more likely than
a player who made an honest statement.
Finally, we find that all effects are more pronounced in round 2 than in round 1. But,
the explanatory power of both models decreases sharply between both rounds. In round
1, the cash- and killer-criterion in model (1) explain a 16% higher mass of the variance
than in round 2 (Pseudo R2=0.24 to Pseudo R2=0.008), and the cash-killer-criterion in
model (2) explains a 14% higher mass of the variance than model (2) in round 2 (R2=0.23
to R2=0.09). This decline serves as a further indicator for the switch between players’
voting behavior. It is likely that players decide on whom to vote off the game by means
of sympathy or trustworthiness. Unfortunately, we are not able to directly control for
those effects.
Summary Our conjectures regarding player’s strategy are largely confirmed in the
data. As we expected, in round 1 neither player takes into account the statements about
the hidden back row balls, and only decides on whom to vote by means of the ex-ante
criteria. However, players discriminate against non-whites. On the contrary, in round 2
taste characteristics become meaningless, but players punish liars, i.e., liars have to bear
the danger of being voted off more likely. Additionally, a player who decides to state the
content of her hidden back row balls first is more likely to survive round 2. Surprisingly,
the trustworthiness of players is highly valued in both rounds. Hence, strategic consid-
erations, such as accumulating a high jackpot and selecting a cooperator as the final
28From a psychological perspective, people may recognize a liar with the help of certain body signals,
for instance, avoiding eye contact, sweating, or blushing.
29The results on the probability of receiving two or three votes in round 1 or 2 are very similar to
the ones from the probit model on the player’s likelihood to be effectively voted off. This confirms the
results, since receiving two or three votes (likely) results in the player’s elimination from the game.
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opponent, rather than player’s characteristics appear to be the primary determinants of
voting behavior in round 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze cooperative behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game in the pres-
ence of high stakes, communication, and two rounds of pre-play, involving two voting
decisions. Using data from 222 episodes of the British television game show “Golden
Balls”, we observe a unilateral cooperation rate of 55% and a mutual cooperation rate of
33%.
Summarizing our main results, we find that stake size, communication as well as pre-
play have a significant impact on cooperation. Stake size is inversely related to player’s
likelihood to cooperate, i.e., the higher the jackpot the more likely players are to defect.
Further we can show that player’s expectation about the stake size matters: If the jack-
pot is above (below) the player’s expectation, the propensity to cooperate significantly
decreases (increases), and mutual cooperation is less (more) successful. With respect to
communication, certain words and gestures are more important than others. We test
for the effect of handshakes and voluntarily stated mutual promises, and find that play-
ers who shake hands are more likely to defect, while handshakes in combination with a
promise are likely to result in cooperation and successful coordination. The effects of
stake size and communication are robust and independent of player characteristics and
pre-play determinants.
The analysis of contestants’ behavior in the pre-play shows that players make their vot-
ing decision dependent on objective criteria, i.e., their monetary contribution to the stake
size, as well as on subjective personal characteristics of their opponents. We show that
there is a strong link between the two rounds of pre-play and the players’ decision in
the prisoner’s dilemma. Whether a player lied in the pre-play or contributed more to
the stake size has a negative influence on cooperative behavior, whereas whether a player
enjoys her opponent’s goodwill has a positive one.
We are aware that there are potential drawbacks associated with the use of television
game show data. The first addresses anonymity: Players on the show interact face-to-
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face and in front of large audience, including their family, friends, and colleagues. This
might amplify cooperative behavior, e.g., a selfish-person might choose to cooperate only
to avoid embarrassment or punishment by her peer group. The second addresses the se-
lection of players for the show: Contestants are not randomly selected, but have to apply
to the show. But, with respect to players exogenous personal characteristics, the sample
can be considered, at least to some extent, as representative of the underlying (British)
population.
This paper has shown that decisions in the prisoner’s dilemma are influenced by the stake
size, the player’s expectation about stakes, and communication. We are not aware of any
other study using handshakes and promises, as well as a player’s expectation about stake
size to explain cooperative behavior.
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Not for Publication: Supplementary Material
A Instructions of the prisoner’s dilemma
The show host Jasper Carrott explains the “weak” prisoner’s dilemma in every episode
with almost the same words:
“It is time to split or steal. You have got two final golden balls left, you have
each got a golden ball with the word split written inside, you have got each
a golden ball with the word steal written inside. I will ask you to make a
conscious choice and you will choose either the split or the steal ball, neither
of you will know what the other has chosen. If you both choose the split balls,
you split today’s jackpot of £J and you both go home with £J/2. If one of
you splits and one of you steals, whoever steals goes home with all the money
£J , whoever splits goes home with nothing. If you both decide to steal and
you are very greedy, you both go home with nothing. Before I ask you to
choose, Player A, B just check the two balls to make sure you know which is
to split and which is to steal. Do not show to each other. It is very important
that you know which is which. [players check the balls] Are you happy
to know which is split and which is steal? Okay, before I ask you to choose, I
will give you some time to talk to each other about what has happened today
and how you feel. [players discuss] Okay, player A, B choose the split or
steal ball now. [players choose balls] Hold it up, make sure that when
you open it, the other player can see it. Player A, B split or steal? [players
open balls]”
B An alternative empirical strategy
In Section 5, we have shown which factors significantly influence cooperative behavior. In
this section we present an alternative approach. Before the show starts, contestants are
individually asked to make a private statement about the strategy they plan to play in
case they reach the final round (see Section 3.2). These filmed statements are broadcasted
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to the television audience, but cannot be observed by the contestants.
We observe an unambiguous strategy-statement by 59% of the final players. Given these
individual statements, we can infer whether contestants stick to their announced strategy,
i.e., behave consistently or not. If players are either defectors or cooperators, independent
of the situation and their opponent, we should neither observe switching strategies nor
significant effects of any explanatory variables.
In Table B.1 we depict the average cooperation rate depending on the players’ strategy-
statement.
Table B.1: Relation between commitment and the cooperation rate
Decision
Statement N % Steal (%) Split (%)
Steal 136 33,3 64.7 35.3
Split 105 25,7 22.9 77.1
Ambiguous 167 43,1 43.1 56.9
Total 408a 100 45.1 54.9
a Note, that the strategy-statement is not filmed in the first 18
episodes. This reduces the data set to 204 episodes (408 players).
Interestingly, the raw data show that contestants more often state to steal than to split
(33,3% versus 25,7%). But we find that players switch their strategy significantly more
often (p=0.008) if they initially planned to steal (35.3% split) than if they planned to
split (22.9% steal). Addressing the players who do not explicitly state their strategy, we
find that 56.9% actually split. The difference between those and the observed average
cooperation rate (54,5%) is not significant (p=0.587).
Thus, one could surmise that a substantial fraction of players are of a certain type,
either cooperators or defectors. The ones that change their strategy make their strategy
dependent on the events in the game as well as on opponent characteristics. We therefore
can conclude that at least 17.6% of the players have situation dependent social preferences.
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C Tables
Table C.1: Cooperation rates by gender, series, demographics, and stake size
Split
Men Women All
(N=207) (N=237) (N=444)
Row % Row % Row % N
Experience
Unexperienced (Series 1) 44.4 59.1 52.5 80
Experienced (Series 2-4) 55.0 54.9 54.9 364
Age
≤ 40 44.3 53.1 49.2 260
> 40 64.1 59.8 62.0 184
Race
Non-White 46.2 42.9 44.4 27
White 53.6 56.5 55.2 417
England
Not from England 73.3 70.7 71.8 71
From England 49.4 52.3 50.9 371
Jackpot in £
[3, 500] 71.4 75.7 73.6 72
(500, 2500] 50.9 55.6 53.0 100
(2500, 10000] 56.0 50.0 52.9 102
(10000, 30000] 43.2 51.4 48.3 116
(30000, 100150] 43.5 51.6 48.1 54
Potential Jackpot in £
[5000, 30000] 46.3 51.7 49.1 114
(30000, 45000] 49.3 58.5 53.6 138
(45000, 75000] 52.3 58.3 55.8 104
(75000, 168100] 72.2 53.8 61.4 88
Expectation
Jackpot < Expectation 58.3 59.5 58.9 292
Jackpot ≥ Expectation 41.3 49.4 46.1 152
Total 53.1 55.7 54.5 444
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Table C.2: Mutual decision outcomes by series, demographics and stake size
(steal, steal) (steal, split) (split, split)
Row % Row % Row % N
Experience
Unexperienced (Series 1) 25.0 45.0 30.0 80
Experienced (Series 2-4) 24.2 41.8 34.1 364
Gender
Male Team 35.3 32.4 32.4 68
Female Team 16.3 55.1 28.6 98
Mixed Team 24.5 40.3 35.3 278
Age
Old Team (> 40) 11.8 50.0 38.2 68
Young Team (≤ 40) 23.6 48.6 27.8 144
Mixed Team 28.4 36.2 35.3 232
England
Not English Team 25.0 25.0 50.0 8
English Team 28.6 39.0 32.5 308
Mixed Team 14.3 52.4 33.3 126
Jackpot
≤ £500 8.3 36.1 55.6 72
> £500 27.4 43.5 29.0 372
Expectation
Jackpot < Expectation 23.3 35.6 41.1 292
Jackpot ≥ Expectation 26.3 55.3 18.4 152
Total 24.3 42.3 33.3 444
Average Winnings (0, 0) (15693, 0) (4784, 4784) 444
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Table C.3: Results from ordered probit on outcomes in the PD (2)
y = 0; 1; 2 Marginal Effectsa
Steal/Steal (0) Split/Steal (1) Split/Split (2)
Player Characteristics
Team Unexperienced 0.015 (0.066) 0.003 (0.010) -0.018 (0.075)
Team Male 0.094 (0.088) 0.005 (0.011) -0.099 (0.082)
Team Female 0.020 (0.064) 0.003 (0.010) -0.023 (0.074)
Team > 40 -0.065 (0.067) -0.021 (0.030) 0.086 (0.097)
Team < 40 0.104 (0.065) 0.012 (0.011) -0.116 (0.069)
Team England 0.109** (0.051) 0.034 (0.023) -0.143** (0.070)
Team Small City 0.069 (0.049) 0.013 (0.012) -0.082 (0.058)
Index -0.332** (0.165) -0.065 (0.047) 0.397** (0.197)
Pre-Play
Team Never Lied -0.055 (0.059) -0.016 (0.023) 0.070 (0.081)
Team Lying 0.029 (0.052) 0.005 (0.009) -0.035 (0.061)
Communication
Handshakes 0.097 (0.097) 0.019 (0.015) -0.116 (0.110)
Promise -0.062 (0.101) 0.125*** (0.021) 0.075 (0.119)
Handshakes*Promise -0.327*** (0.109) 0.035 (0.085) 0.361*** (0.134)
Stake Size
Jackpot < Expectation -0.161*** (0.055) -0.013 (0.015) 0.174*** (0.056)
Wald X 2 28.98**
Log-Likelihood -223.65
Pseudo R2 0.06
N 54 94 74
Number of clusters 222
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Voting decision by means of objective criteria
After round 1b After round 2
Criteria to predict a player in out in out
who should be voted to leavea Row % Row % Row % Row %
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
stay 87.2 12.8 72.3 27.7
vote to leave 38.3 61.7 55.4 44.6
stated
stay 76.7 23.3 70.0 30.0
vote to leave 69.8 30.2 59.9 40.1
ex-post
stay 83.0 17.0 74.8 25.2
vote to leave 50.9 49.1 50.5 49.5
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
stay 92.0 8.0 83.6 16.4
vote to leave 23.9 76.1 32.9 67.1
stated
stay 93.7 6.3 85.1 14.9
vote to leave 18.9 81.1 29.7 70.3
ex-post
stay 86.6 13.4 80.9 19.1
vote to leave 40.1 59.9 38.3 61.7
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
stay 87.7 12.3 73.2 26.8
vote to leave 36.9 63.1 53.6 46.4
stated
stay 83.3 16.7 74.1 25.9
vote to leave 50.0 50.0 51.8 48.2
ex-post
stay 83.2 16.8 74.5 25.5
vote to leave 50.5 49.5 50.9 49.1
N 666 222 444 222
a We take into account that the prediction might not be unique per
episode, i.e., more than one player might have a prediction to be
eliminated.
b Each round, 222 contestants are eliminated. In round 1 (2) 55.4%
(52.2%) of the eliminated players are men.
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Table C.5: Voting decision per player by means of objective criteria
Players voted by means of
all (%) men (%) women (%)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
Round 1 72.4 74.5 70.5
Round 2 66.5 67.3 65.8
stated
Round 1 36.0 38.5 33.6
Round 2 64.4 62.6 66.1
ex-post
Round 1 55.3 55.4 55.3
Round 2 70.2 66.9 73.2
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
Round 1 82.1 83.0 81.3
Round 2 81.9 84.9 79.1
stated
Round 1 83.6 85.5 81.8
Round 2 78.9 80.2 77.6
ex-post
Round 1 70.9 72.7 69.2
Round 2 76.3 77.0 75.6
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
Round 1 71.0 74.1 68.1
Round 2 65.8 67.3 64.4
stated
Round 1 55.0 58.3 51.9
Round 2 63.5 61.9 65.1
ex-post
Round 1 60.4 61.5 59.3
Round 2 66.8 65.5 68.1
Na 573 278 (48.5%) 295 (51.5%)
a Note: For purpose of comparability, we restrain the sample to 573 ob-
servations including only those players, who are not being eliminated
in round 1. Further we consider only those decisions for which we can
trace back for whom a player voted, i.e., we exclude episodes with a
voting of 2:1:1:0 in round 1 and 1:1:1 in round 2.
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Table C.6: Voting decision per player under risk or ambiguity (by means of objective
criteria)
Round 2 Round 1
Players vote by means of Uncertainty Partial Ambiguity Ambiguity Ambiguity
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
ex-ante
all 64.0 66.3 67.2 72.4
men 82.4 64.9 67.7 74.5
women 54.5 67.6 66.7 70.5
stated
all 58.0 67.7 61.8 36.0
men 52.9 65.7 60.6 38.5
women 60.6 69.6 63.2 33.6
ex-post
all 74.0 70.2 69.3 55.3
men 70.6 66.4 66.9 55.4
women 75.8 73.6 71.9 55.3
Killer-Criterion (KC)
ex-ante
all 84.3 79.8 84.0 82.1
men 82.4 81.3 89.1 83.0
women 85.3 78.4 78.3 81.3
stated
all 84.0 75.9 81.3 83.6
men 94.1 76.9 81.9 85.5
women 78.8 75.0 80.7 81.8
ex-post
all 78.0 75.2 77.2 70.9
men 88.2 76.9 75.6 72.7
women 72.7 73.6 78.9 69.2
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
ex-ante
all 60.0 64.9 68.0 71.0
men 76.5 62.7 70.9 74.1
women 51.5 66.9 64.9 68.1
stated
all 70.0 61.7 64.3 55.0
men 70.6 59.0 63.8 58.3
women 69.7 64.2 64.9 51.9
ex-post
all 76.0 66.3 65.6 60.4
men 88.2 64.9 63.0 61.5
women 69.7 67.6 68.4 59.3
Na 50 282 241 573
a Note: The sample is restricted to the same 573 players in round 1 and 2.
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Table C.7: Ordered probit regression results on the number of votes (round 1)
yie = 0; 1; 2; 3 (Number of votes a player receives in round 1 per episode)
Marginal Effects
No. of Votes Variables Model (1) Model (2)
0 Player Characteristics
Male -0.051 (0.035) -0.051 (0.035)
Age > 40 0.012 (0.034) 0.015 (0.034)
White 0.135** (0.058) 0.126** (0.059)
England -0.009 (0.045) -0.002 (0.046)
Order of Statements 0.021 (0.042) 0.016 (0.042)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) 0.097*** (0.010)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.025 (0.019)
Truthful Statements 0.111*** (0.036)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls -0.159*** (0.040)
No. Killers Stated Balls -0.007 (0.050)
Truthful Statements 0.148*** (0.037)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) 0.110*** (0.007)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.011 (0.012)
Truthful Statements 0.138*** (0.036)
1 Player Characteristics
Male 0.007 (0.005) 0.008 (0.006)
Age > 40 -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005)
White -0.005 (0.005) -0.008** (0.004)
England 0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.007)
Order of Statements -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.007)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.013*** (0.002)
logsumvalueclaims1 0.003 (0.003)
Truthful Statements -0.011*** (0.004)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.021*** (0.007)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.001 (0.007)
Truthful Statements -0.012*** (0.003)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.017*** (0.003)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.002 (0.002)
Truthful Statements -0.022*** (0.007)
2 Player Characteristics
Male 0.025 (0.017) 0.024 (0.017)
Age > 40 -0.006 (0.016) -0.007 (0.016)
White -0.064** (0.027) -0.060** (0.028)
England 0.004 (0.022) 0.001 (0.022)
Order of Statements -0.010 (0.020) -0.008 (0.020)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.047*** (0.006)
logsumvalueclaims1 0.012 (0.009)
Truthful Statements -0.053*** (0.018)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.076*** (0.020)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.003 (0.024)
Truthful Statements -0.071*** (0.019)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.052*** (0.005)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.005 (0.006)
Truthful Statements -0.066*** (0.018)
3 Player Characteristics
Male 0.020 (0.014) 0.019 (0.013)
Age > 40 -0.005 (0.013) -0.005 (0.013)
White -0.066* (0.036) -0.058* (0.034)
England 0.003 (0.017) 0.001 (0.017)
Order of Statements -0.008 (0.016) -0.006 (0.015)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.037*** (0.005)
logsumvalueclaims1 0.010 (0.007)
Truthful Statements -0.046*** (0.016)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.061*** (0.016)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.003 (0.019)
Truthful Statements -0.066*** (0.019)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.041*** (0.004)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.004 (0.004)
Truthful Statements -0.051*** (0.013)
Wald X2 284.59*** 390.05***
Log-Likelihood -875.00 -870.64
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.19
N 842 842
Number of clusters 211 211
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: 11 special episodes are excluded (all players have the same sex)
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Table C.8: Ordered probit regression results on the number of votes (round 2)
yie = 0; 1; 2 (Number of votes a player receives in round 1 per episode)
Marginal Effects
No. of Votes Variables Model (1) Model (2)
0 Player Characteristics
Male -0.002 (0.037) -0.002 (0.037)
Age > 40 -0.030 (0.035) -0.033 (0.035)
White 0.039 (0.074) 0.031 (0.076)
England -0.045 (0.041) -0.047 (0.042)
Order of Statements 0.175*** (0.046) 0.170*** (0.045)
Lied in Round 1 -0.065** (0.031) -0.062** (0.031)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) 0.036*** (0.009)
log(Value Stated Balls) 0.005 (0.015)
Truthful Statements 0.177*** (0.047)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls -0.047 (0.040)
No. Killers Stated Balls -0.044 (0.033)
Truthful Statements 0.014 (0.054)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) 0.040*** (0.007)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) 0.017* (0.010)
Truthful Statements 0.182*** (0.034)
1 Player Characteristics
Male 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Age > 40 -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
White 0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.006)
England 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Order of Statements -0.014* (0.007) -0.013* (0.007)
Lied in Round 1 -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.000 (0.001)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.000 (0.000)
Truthful Statements 0.004 (0.003)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.000 (0.001)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.000 (0.001)
Truthful Statements 0.000 (0.001)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.000 (0.001)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.000 (0.000)
Truthful Statements 0.004 (0.003)
2 Player Characteristics
Male 0.002 (0.037) 0.002 (0.037)
Age > 40 0.030 (0.036) 0.034 (0.036)
White -0.041 (0.082) -0.032 (0.082)
England 0.043 (0.037) 0.044 (0.038)
Order of Statements -0.161*** (0.039) -0.157*** (0.039)
Lied in Round 1 0.066** (0.031) 0.062** (0.031)
Cash-Criterion (CC)
log(Value Open Balls) -0.036*** (0.010)
log(Value Stated Balls) -0.005 (0.015)
Truthful Statements -0.181*** (0.049)
Killer-Criterion (KC)
No. Killers Open Balls 0.047 (0.040)
No. Killers Stated Balls 0.044 (0.033)
Truthful Statements -0.014 (0.055)
Cash-Killer-Criterion (CKC)
log(Wght. Value Open Balls) -0.040*** (0.007)
log(Wght. Value Stated Balls) -0.017* (0.010)
Truthful Statements -0.186*** (0.036)
Wald X2 102.47*** 110.81***
Log-Likelihood -634.79 -633.74
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09
N 631 631
Number of clusters 211 211
standard errors in parentheses are corrected for episode clusters; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: 11 special episodes are excluded (all players have the same sex)
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